The Latino Shift in the Republican Base Under Trump

This short paper will explore a fascinating shift in the Republican Party base under Trump into a multiracial, working-class one. I will mainly focus on Latinos, the demographic that most significantly turned toward Trump in this election. I will go over various theories, such as a Latino shift toward evangelism, sexism in POC communities, and changes in Trump’s rhetoric. I will conclude that this shift is primarily due to Trump’s personality traits and Kamala’s lack thereof, Latinos’ changing opinions on immigration, and elite/celebrity endorsements of Trump.

When I went to speak to one of my professors about his opinion on why Latino men and Black men, to a certain extent, voted for Trump, he claimed that misogyny was deeply entrenched in Black and Latino communities and that “America is still not ready for a female president.” I had believed this a few months ago when a fellow political science student asked me who I thought would win. I said Trump simply because a lot of voters still have misogynistic tendencies, whether conscious or unconscious. The problem with this theory is that Latino support for Democrats decreased by 1% from 2016 to 2020, from 66% to 65%. Latinos supported Hillary Clinton (a woman) more than Joe Biden (a man), and Latino support for Trump went up in 2020 from 28% to 32%. Although misogyny may play a minor role, something changed in the psyche of Latinos from 2020 to 2024, and I want to know what that is.

This demographic electoral shift is highly significant and can be compared to the white working-class change to the Republican Party under Reagan or the Black shift to the Democrats under Roosevelt and Johnson. In 2016, during Trump’s first run, only 28% of Latino women voted for Trump. In 2020, this number increased to 32%, and in 2024 to 39%. For Latino men, the number started at 28% and increased to 38% in 2020 and 48% in 2024 (Interactive: How Key Groups of Americans Voted in 2024). I find it hard to wrap my mind around the fact that all this electoral support is going toward a man who called Latinos criminals and rapists, among other remarks (Moreno). There was a quote in this article that reads a bit ironically after this election: “If Trump wants to win the Latino vote, he might want to learn from past mistakes” (Moreno). I wondered whether Trump learned from his mistakes and toned down his comments.

Some may hold the idea that Trump’s rhetoric had something to do with this rise in the Latino vote. I really doubt that, considering that by the 2024 election, Trump’s rhetoric had skewed further to the right. The most infamous anti-Latino comments of this election were the Nazi-esque remarks about illegals having “bad genes” and “poisoning the blood of the country” (Trip). Alongside these comments, he promised to end birthright citizenship and enforce mass deportations (Alvarez; Levine). Perhaps most infamously, a comment made at a Trump rally by comedian Tony Hinchcliffe referred to Puerto Rico as a “floating island of garbage” (Licon). This is particularly notable because Pennsylvania’s Latino population has nearly tripled since 2020, with more than half being Puerto Ricans who can vote. Yet, despite this inappropriate comment and Trump’s overall anti-Latino sentiment, he managed to win all 19 of Pennsylvania’s seats, over 50% of the popular vote, and more votes than any other candidate in the state’s history. If rhetoric were what led Trump to victory, we would have expected Latino turnout for Republicans to peak in 2020, the campaign that seemed to have the least brash and xenophobic comments.

Another theory is that Latino support for Republicans is due to a shift toward cultural conservatism and a hardline stance against immigration. According to a PBS interview with Samuel Rodriguez from the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference, the change among Latinos is partly due to a turn toward evangelicalism. Evangelicals are socially conservative and have regularly voted Republican since the late 1970s (Haberman). Rodriguez also noted that many Latinos oppose illegal immigration, supporting the idea that after Latinos immigrate, they may see themselves as distinct from illegals of the same background (Krogstad). This concept mirrors other aspects of human behavior. Legal migrants may perceive themselves as having done things the “right way,” resenting those who take shortcuts, such as entering the country illegally. This is akin to resenting someone who cheats on a test or uses steroids to excel in sports. Even if both achieve the same goal—whether a job in the U.S. or success on a test—we instinctively seek to punish those who break the rules.

It is essential to address questions like these with an analysis of pop culture, considering how much time people spend consuming alternative media. Of course, looking at voters’ and demographics’ concerns and interests is essential, but the “vibes” of a movement can be just as important. People are not rational, calculating beings voting solely based on which candidate materially benefits their lives. For instance, this study shows that a candidate’s physical appearance can predict their success better than chance (Todorov). Additionally, most voters align with their partisan identity, often inherited from their parents. This identity is more about emotional ties and group loyalty than rational platforms (Baym). Politics, like sports, involves allegiance—people cheer for their team due to emotional connections, not logic. Now, the question for me to answer is how Trump changed his way into the hearts of Latinos.

Trump’s appeal lies in his aura of strength, machismo, humor, wealth, and confidence, which resonates with many young men and others. He does funny dances, speaks on platforms like Joe Rogan’s, and exudes an almost cartoonish overconfidence. This is appealing compared to Kamala Harris’ uncertainty, dullness, and annoying laugh. Her tough-on-crime stance as California’s attorney general clashed with her progressive campaign, and she backtracked on her support for Medicare for All. She also refused to denounce mass deportations at a Univision town hall in Nevada (Sacchetti). These are just a few examples that indicate that no one knows what she believes; I doubt she knows what she believes. Her only supporters are feminist moms who think Trump is misogynistic and Black “girlboss” enthusiasts. These niches are not strong enough to win an election. I believe Kamala’s lack of charm did play a significantly more important role in the Democrats’ loss in 2024, especially when it comes to young men. No young man wants to see Cardi B dancing at a Kamala rally; they’d much rather see Trump talking about cocaine with Theo Von. How this relates to the Latino vote is that Latinos are the youngest demographic, and Trump’s appearances with people like Joe Rogan, Dana White, and Theo Von must have benefitted him. This may sound ridiculous initially, but look at UFC and Joe Rogan’s viewing/following statistics, and my proposition is much more plausible.

I firmly believe Trump’s electoral success among young men (including whites, Blacks, and Latinos) in this election was due to his charisma and Kamala’s lack thereof. However, the main reason Trump was able to secure the general Latino vote was his attitude toward immigration. As I mentioned earlier, legal Latino immigrants do not like illegals, and they give them a bad rep. According to Pew Research, this attitude crosses boundaries of age, education, political affiliation, and country of origin (Krogstad). But most significantly, for this paper, Pew Research found that 44% of Hispanics believe illegal immigration to be a big problem in 2021. This is a significant uptick from the 15% recorded in a similar survey in 2020 (Krogstad). Minorities in New York, which voted in much greater numbers for Trump, have been celebrating these deportations: “The foreign criminals are dangerous, so it’s good to get rid of them,” said Mr. Chung, a Peruvian immigrant (Morphet et al). Previously, I considered the hypothesis that perhaps Latinos voted for Trump in more significant numbers due to Democrats moving too far to the left on cultural issues. However, I remembered Trump is a fake Christian, borderline pro-choice, and sees prostitutes. Also, the Pew Research surveys I looked at found that Latinos are relatively progressive when it comes to abortion, guns, religion, and state and LGBT rights, debunking this hypothesis (Jens Manuel Krogstad).

Despite Americans stating that the economy was their most significant concern, this is not true. Although Republicans are typically better for the economy, proposed tariffs against China, Canada, and Mexico would have dissuaded any economist from voting for Trump. Alongside this, the U.S. GDP per capita recovered rapidly after the coronavirus pandemic, and in 2024, the inflation rate was down to 2.9% from the COVID peak of 7%. People love to complain about the economy; even if that were their primary concern, Kamala would have been a better choice.
From my research, the Latino shift toward Trump appears to be primarily driven by concerns about immigration and the influence of high-profile endorsements. The cultural conservatism hypothesis does not hold, as Latinos remain socially liberal, and the sexism argument is undermined by their preference for Clinton over Trump in 2016. Additionally, Trump’s rhetoric has only grown more extreme, countering the idea that his character has improved. Immigration remained a central issue for many Americans, and the “Trump Train” became a cultural trend, with cringe-worthy music videos from figures like Tom McDonald, Lil Pump, and the “Trump Latinos” reflecting this shift.

Beyond immigration, a broader “vibe shift” favoring Trump among influential figures likely played a role, particularly in mobilizing younger voters. Celebrities such as Joe Rogan, Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, Lil Wayne, Kodak Black, Snoop Dogg, and Mike Tyson publicly aligned with Trump, making his support seem trendy. Given that Latinos are the youngest racial demographic in the U.S. and that voting behavior is often driven more by social influence than pure rational calculation, it is reasonable to conclude that celebrity endorsements contributed to the increase in Latino support for Trump.

Works Cited

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